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A substantial literature has identified systematic ways in which individuals vio-
late standard economic assumptions (see Colin F. Camerer, George Loewenstein, 
and Matthew Rabin 2004). This literature includes both laboratory and field studies 
(for reviews, see Camerer 2000; Camerer, Loewenstein, and Rabin 2003; Stefano 
DellaVigna 2009).
In spite of the extant literature documenting behavioral biases, many scholars—
including some who have documented behavioral biases—remain skeptical of the 
claim that biases persist in markets (e.g., John A. List 2003, Steven D. Levitt and 
List 2008, Sergiu Hart 2005).1 Critics of the decision bias literature believe that 
biases are likely to be extinguished by competition, large stakes, and experience.
Levitt and List (2008) summarize their concern with the bias literature: “Perhaps 
the greatest challenge facing behavioral economics is demonstrating its applicability 
in the real world. In nearly every instance, the strongest empirical evidence in favor 
of behavioral anomalies emerges from the lab. Yet, there are many reasons to suspect 
that these laboratory findings might fail to generalize to real markets.”
1 Despite the fact that List has argued that behavioral biases can be mitigated by economic markets, he has been 
very open to behavioral work in general (e.g., List 2002; Michael Haigh and List 2005).
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errors, many leading scholars believe that experience, competition, 
and large stakes will reliably extinguish biases. We test for the pres-
ence of a fundamental bias, loss aversion, in a high-stakes context: 
professional golfers’ performance on the PGA Tour. Golf provides a 
natural setting to test for loss aversion because golfers are rewarded 
for the total number of strokes they take during a tournament, yet 
each individual hole has a salient reference point, par. We analyze 
over 2.5 million putts using precise laser measurements and find 
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evidence of loss aversion. (JEL D03, D81, L83)
* Pope: University of Chicago, 5807 Woodlawn Ave., Chicago, IL 60637 (e-mail: devin.pope@chicagobooth.
edu); Schweitzer: The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 3730 Walnut Street #566, Philadelphia, PA 
19104 (e-mail: Schweitzer@wharton.upenn.edu). We thank Bob Batt for excellent research support and Ken Lovell 
and Mike Vitti at the PGA TOUR for help with ShotLink data access. We also thank David Abrams, Nick Barberis, 
Gerard Cachon, Colin Camerer, Stefano DellaVigna, Kirk Doran, Peter Fishman, Adam Galinsky, John Hershey, 
Daniel Kahneman, Bruce Kothmann, Kory Kroft, Howard Kunreuther, Rob Letzler, Steve Levitt, Cade Massey, 
Arden Pope, Jaren Pope, Uri Simonsohn, Justin Sydnor, Richard Thaler, Jeremy Tobacman, Maisy Wong, Justin 
Wolfers, and seminar participants at Carnegie Mellon, the Federal Trade Commission, and The Wharton School 
for helpful comments and suggestions. We are also grateful to the Wharton Sports Business Initiative for generous 
funding. All errors are our own.
130 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW FEBRUARY 2011
In this paper, we examine field evidence of loss aversion, a fundamental bias and 
a key component of Prospect Theory (Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky 1979). 
We consider a market with high stakes and experienced agents: The PGA Tour. The 
PGA Tour brings professional golfers together to play in a series of Tournaments 
each year. In each Tournament, golfers attempt to minimize the total number of 
shots they take across 72 holes. We focus our attention on putts, the final shots 
players take to complete a hole. We compare putts golfers attempted for par (the 
typical number of shots professional golfers take to complete a hole) to putts golfers 
attempted for scores different from par, such as birdie (one shot less than par). Our 
sample includes more than 2.5 million putts with laser measurements of initial and 
final ball placement (x, y, z coordinates). This is an ideal setting to test for loss aver-
sion. Though golfers should care only about their overall Tournament score, golfers 
may be influenced by the salient, but normatively irrelevant, reference point of par 
when they attempt putts.
In contrast to the normative account, we find that golfers are significantly influ-
enced by the reference point of par. When golfers are “under par” (e.g., shoot a 
“birdie” putt that would earn them a score one stroke under par or shoot an “eagle” 
putt that would earn them a score two strokes under par) they are significantly less 
accurate than when they attempt otherwise similar putts for par or are “over par” 
(e.g., shoot a “bogey” putt that would earn them a score one stroke over par or shoot 
a “double bogey” putt that would earn them a score two strokes over par). Though 
we analyze each of these types of putts, most of the putts in our data involve birdie 
and par putts, and we summarize our results with respect to these putts. For exam-
ple, on average, golfers make their birdie putts approximately 2 percentage points 
less often than they make comparable par putts. This finding is consistent with loss 
aversion; players invest more focus when putting for par to avoid encoding a loss.
Beyond controlling for distance, consider and rule out several competing expla-
nations for this finding. First, prior to hitting a par putt, players may have learned 
something about the green (by having already attempted a birdie putt). Second, 
birdie putts may start from a more precarious position on the green than par putts 
due to a longer approach shot. Third, player or Tournament-specific differences may 
bias our results. Using detailed data, we are able to rule out competing explanations 
with control methods and matching estimators. For example, we can match par and 
birdie putts attempted within one inch of each other on the exact same hole in the 
same Tournament. We are also able to rule out other psychological explanations. For 
example, we consider whether or not players become more nervous or overconfident 
when they shoot birdie putts relative to par putts.
Our finding, that golfers are less accurate when attempting birdie putts than par 
putts, is moderated by Tournament round. The accuracy gap between par and birdie 
putts is largest in the first round of the Tournament (first 18 holes) and is less than 
half as large in the fourth round of the Tournament (last 18 holes). This finding dem-
onstrates that the accuracy gap between par and birdie putts is neither automatic nor 
immutable. Consistent with our loss aversion account, early in the Tournament, the 
reference point of par is likely to be very salient; later in the Tournament, alterna-
tive reference points, such as the scores of competitors, are likely to become salient.
We also find evidence to support an additional prediction of Prospect Theory: a 
risk shift. Prospect Theory predicts that economic agents will be more risk averse in 
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the gain domain than they are in the loss domain. If professional golfers use par as 
a reference point, they should be more cautious when putting for birdie (in the gain 
domain for a specific hole) than when putting for par. Specifically, conditional on 
missing a putt, we find that golfers hit birdie putts less hard than they hit par putts 
and are more likely to leave birdie putts short of the hole than par putts. In graphi-
cal analysis, we demonstrate that players sacrifice success when putting for birdie 
to avoid difficult follow-up putts. This pattern of results is consistent with Prospect 
Theory and decreases expected profits.
Recent theoretical work has conceptualized expectations as reference points 
(Botond K ˝    oszegi and Rabin 2006). Little prior work, however, has directly tested 
this theory (see Vincent P. Crawford and Juanjuan Meng 2008 and Kirk Doran 2008 
for exceptions). In our data, we test for endogenous reference points by considering 
performance on holes in which players should expect to score either higher or lower 
than par. Our findings provide evidence consistent with K ˝    oszegi and Rabin’s (2006) 
prediction and suggest that expectations influence reference point adoption.
In short, our findings demonstrate that loss aversion persists in a market setting 
with intense competition, large stakes, and very experienced agents. Even the best 
golfers—including Tiger Woods—exhibit loss aversion.
We organize the paper in the following way: In Section I, we provide background 
information about loss aversion and professional golf. In Section II, we develop a 
conceptual framework to understand how loss aversion influences golf performance. 
In Section III, we describe the data and present our empirical strategy. We report our 
results and rule out competing explanations in Section IV, and we conclude with a 
discussion of our findings and their broader implications in Section V.
I.  Background on Loss Aversion and Golf
A. Prospect Theory and Loss Aversion
Rather than make consistent decisions over final wealth states, Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) postulate that economic agents evaluate decisions in isolation with 
respect to a salient reference point. In Prospect Theory, Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) propose a reference-dependent theory of choice in which economic agents 
value gains differently than they value losses in two key ways. First, economic 
agents value losses more than they value commensurate gains (loss aversion); the 
“value function” is kinked at the reference point with a steeper gradient for losses 
than for gains. Second, economic agents are risk seeking in losses and risk averse 
in gains (risk shift); the utility function is convex in the loss domain and concave in 
the gain domain.
This model of reference dependent preferences has profound implications. If 
individuals segregate related decisions, they may choose different outcomes. For 
example, loss aversion and the risk shift may cause an individual to reject a series 
of small gambles with positive expected return but accept the aggregated gamble. 
Shlomo Benartzi and Richard H. Thaler (1995) studied this problem in the domain 
of retirement saving. Benartzi and Thaler (1995) found that people who evaluated 
their portfolios frequently (and made a series of related decisions) made different 
hypothetical choices than did people who evaluated their portfolios infrequently. 
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Daniel Read, Loewenstein, and Rabin (1999) studied the issue of segregating deci-
sions explicitly and coined the term “narrow bracketing” to describe how individu-
als segregate or bracket related decisions.
Loss aversion has been documented in many laboratory settings (e.g., Thaler et 
al. 1997; Uri Gneezy and Jan Potters 1997) and in several field settings (see David 
Genesove and Christopher Mayer 2001; Camerer et al. 1997; Ernst Fehr and Lorenz 
Goette 2007; Terrence Odean 1998, and Alex Mas 2006). Some scholars, however, 
have found evidence to suggest that experience and large stakes may eliminate deci-
sion errors (List 2003, 2004).
Our paper makes an important contribution to the literature by documenting 
loss aversion in a competitive field setting, with large stakes, and very experienced 
agents. Our paper is also atypical in that we have an unusually large amount of sta-
tistical power and a well-defined reference point. In addition, we are able to directly 
test for evidence of small-scale risk aversion and whether or not reference points 
change based upon expectations (K ˝    oszegi and Rabin 2006).
B. Professional Golf
We analyze decisions made by professional golfers playing in the PGA Tour.2 The 
PGA Tour is a collection of Tournaments (40–50 each year) in which professional 
golfers (approximately 150 per Tournament) compete. In each Tournament, golfers 
play 18 holes of golf on each of four consecutive days (four “rounds”). After the 
second round, golfers with a score that places them in the bottom third are elimi-
nated from the Tournament. All of the remaining players compete in the final two 
rounds and share the total purse for the Tournament (in 2008 the average purse for 
each Tournament was approximately $5 million). The distribution of payments is 
highly convex; for example, the winner typically earns 18 percent of the purse.
In golf, players begin by placing a ball on a wooden tee and hitting (or “driving”) 
the ball towards a hole. The players typically end each hole by putting, attempt-
ing a short shot on the well-manicured patch of grass (the “green”) near the hole. 
Each player’s score is the sum total of his strokes, or hits, across all 72 holes in the 
Tournament.3 The player with the lowest score wins the Tournament.
For historical reasons, each hole is assigned a value or “par.” On PGA Tour 
courses, each hole has a par value equal to 3, 4, or 5. The par value represents the 
number of strokes that professional golfers often require to finish a hole, and both 
common golfer parlance and score cards represent performance on each hole with 
respect to par. Golfers who complete a hole one or two strokes under par have shot a 
“birdie” or “eagle,” respectively. Golfers who complete a hole equal to par have shot 
par. Golfers who complete a hole one or two strokes over par have shot a “bogey” 
or “double bogey,” respectively. On scorecards, golfers draw a circle for holes they 
shot under par and a square for holes they shot over par. Scores relative to par are 
2 Golf has been used as the context of several papers in economics including Ronald G. Ehrenberg and Michael 
L. Bognanno (1990), Christopher Cotton and Joseph Price (2006), Jennifer Brown (2007), and Jonathan Guryan, 
Kory Kroft, and Matthew J. Notowidigdo (2009).
3 This scoring method is called “stroke play” or “medal play” which is by far the most popular method of scor-
ing in professional golf. However, other scoring systems such as “match play” do exist. Our data consists only of 
Tournaments that were scored using stroke play. 
133POPE AND SCHWEITZER: IS TIGER WOODS LOSS AVERSE?VOL. 101 NO. 1
also quite salient because broadcasters and reporters will often refer to a golfer’s 
score on different holes relative to par. Although it is only performance across the 
72 holes that matters, we postulate that par for individual holes will serve as a salient 
reference point and influence performance.
II.  Conceptual Framework
We develop a simple conceptual framework to describe the influence that loss 
aversion may have on putting. When golfers attempt a putt, they can either make the 
putt and earn a score of Δx, or miss the putt. For simplicity, we start by assuming 
that if a golfer misses his first putt, he makes his following putt and earns a score 
of Δx − 1. In this framework, Δx represents the number of strokes (either positive 
or negative) from par.
We consider the probability of making a putt to be a function of effort, which is 
endogenously set by the golfer, and other observable putt characteristics. Specifically,
(1)  Pr (make putt) =   f (e, z) +  ε,
where e represents the amount of effort exerted, z represents a vector of other 
putt characteristics (e.g., putt distance), and ε is random noise. We assume that 
f ′ w.r.t. e ≥ 0 and f ″  w.r.t. e ≤ 0 indicating that additional effort weakly increases 
the probability of making a putt and that f (*)  is weakly concave in effort.
In our formulation, we consider the possibility that golfers do not consistently 
deliver their maximum effort for each putt. Golfers may devote different amounts of 
effort to their putts throughout the Tournament. This conceptualization is consistent 
with previous work, which has found that rather than playing consistently across 
every hole, golfers’ performance varies according to the incentives they face (Brown 
2007; Ehrenberg and Bognanno 1990).4
For each putt, golfers derive the following utility:
(2) U  =  ( f (e, z) +  ε) V (Δ x) +  (1  −  f (e, z) −   ε) V (Δ x  −  1) −   cost(e).
Each golfer’s utility is equal to the values placed on making and missing the putt 
weighted by their probabilities and subtracting the cost of effort, which we assume 
to be strictly increasing (cost′(e) > 0) and convex (cost″(e) < 0).
Incorporating loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), we represent the 
value function V(∙) as
(3) V (Δ x) =  {  Δ x   λΔx     if Δ x  ≥  0   if Δx  <  0,  
where λ ≥ 1 is the degree of loss aversion. This value function is a simple version 
(without diminishing sensitivity in gains or losses) of the value function described 
4 This is also consistent with evidence from other sports that suggests that players/teams adjust their effort levels 
when psychologically discouraged (e.g., Chaim Fershtman and Gneezy 2007) or psychologically motivated (e.g., 
Jonah Berger and Pope 2009).
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in Prospect Theory and embeds the standard model (λ = 1). Figure 1 illustrates this 
value function within the domain of golf. As depicted in the figure, the difference in 
value between scoring a birdie and a par on a hole is smaller than the difference in 
value between scoring a par and a bogey. It is also worth noting that we define this 
value function with respect to each single hole. With this formulation, we implicitly 
assume that players are narrow bracketing within each hole.
Maximizing the utility function in equation (2) yields the following first-order 
condition:
(4) cost′(e) =   ∂ f (e, z) _∂e   [V (Δ x) − V (Δ x  −  1)] .
Combining equations (3) and (4) results in the following:
(5) {  cost′(e) _ ∂f(e,z) _∂e    =  1 if Δx  ≥  1 cost′(e) _
 ∂f(e,z) _∂e  


















Figure 1. Prospect Theory in the Domain of Golf with Par as the Reference Point
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These first-order conditions indicate that a golfer chooses an optimal level of effort, 
e*, by setting the marginal cost of effort equal to the marginal benefit of effort when 
putting for birdie or eagle (Δx ≥ 1). However, when putting for par, bogey, or 
double bogey, the golfer chooses a higher optimal effort level, which equates the 
ratio of the marginal cost and benefit of effort to λ.
The first-order conditions imply that players choose higher effort levels in the 
loss domain (e.g., putting for par, bogey, or double bogey) than they do in the gain 
domain (e.g., putting for birdie or eagle), and we combine this implication with 
equation (1) to develop the following testable prediction.
PREDICTION 1: Controlling for putt characteristics, z, putts attempted for par, bogey, 
and double bogey will be more accurate than putts attempted for birdie and eagle.
In equation (3), we represent a simple, linear value function (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979) that contains a loss aversion parameter. Equation (6) extends equa-
tion (3) to represent a value function with both a loss aversion parameter and sepa-
rate risk preference parameters for the gain and loss domains:
(6) V(Δ x) =  { ​Δ ​x α     − λ( − Δ x)β    if Δ x  ≥  0   if Δ x  <  0 .
 In this value function, α and β < 1 are parameters that allow for “diminishing sen-
sitivity.” Incremental gains in Δ x above the reference point result in progressively 
smaller utility improvements. Conversely, incremental reductions in Δ x below the 
reference point result in progressively smaller declines in utility. The curvature of 
these lines induces players to exert less effort for a putt that is much below or much 
above par. With diminishing sensitivity (as represented in equation (6)), new first-
order conditions support the following hypotheses.
PREDICTION 2: Controlling for putt characteristics, z, the probability of making 
a birdie putt is greater than the probability of making an eagle putt. In addition, 
controlling for putt characteristics, z, the probability of making a par putt is greater 
than the probability of making a bogey putt, and the probability of making a bogey 
putt is greater than the probability of making a double bogey putt.
In our conceptual framework, we assumed that if golfers miss their first putt, they 
will make their following putt. This is empirically common but certainly not auto-
matic. A golfer may miss both the initial and the second putts. We include this pos-
sibility to develop a prediction reflecting risk preferences. Compared to risk-seeking 
putts, risk-averse putts are less likely to drop in the hole but are more likely to set up 
easy-to-make follow-on putts.
As a result of both the loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity components of 
Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), golfers in the domain of gains 
(golfers attempting eagle or bogey putts) will be more likely to choose risk averse 
putts than golfers in the domain of losses (golfers attempting par, bogey, or double 
bogey putts). This leads to our final prediction:
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PREDICTION 3: Controlling for putt characteristics, z, players will be more risk 
averse when putting for birdie and eagle than when putting for par, bogey, or double 
bogey.
In the results section, we discuss how we measure risk aversion in the context of golf 
in order to test Prediction 3.
III.  Data and Empirical Strategy
To test our predictions, we need to control for putt characteristics, z. This requires 
access to a rich dataset, which we obtained from the PGA Tour. Since 2002, the PGA 
Tour has employed approximately 250 workers to gather information each week. Of 
particular relevance to our investigation, the PGA Tour mounts lasers around each hole 
of a course to measure every shot each player attempts. These laser measurements 
record with great precision (within less than one inch) the x, y, and z coordinates of 
the resting position of each ball after every shot. The PGA Tour collected these data 
to provide information for print journalism, broadcasting, instant online updates, and 
basic statistics. These data, however, also enable us to test our predictions.
In our analyses, we include data from 239 Tournaments completed between 2004 
and 2009. We focus on putts, and we restrict our dataset to putts attempted for eagle, 
birdie, par, bogey, or double bogey.5 Due to computational constraints, we restrict 
the data to players for whom we have at least 1,000 putts, leaving us with 2,525,161 
putts attempted by 421 professional golfers.6 In Table 1, we report summary statis-
tics. Most of the putts in our data were for either par (47.0 percent) or birdie (39.8 
percent). As a result, a large portion of our identification will contrast par and birdie 
putts.
To test predictions 1 and 2, we compare the probability of making putts with 
different values relative to par (e.g., bogey, par, birdie, or eagle) that are otherwise 
similar. Our main specifications take the following form:
(7)   Make Put t ijk   =    α j   +   δ k   + β (Value Relative to Pa r ijk ) + γ  Z ijk   +   ε ijk .
The indicator Make Put t ijk for each putt i, player j, and specific hole (in a given round 
and Tournament) k is represented as a linear function with player and hole fixed effects, 
a vector of dummy variables indicating the value relative to par (e.g., birdie), a vector 
of control variables (e.g., distance to the hole), and a random error term.
Our controls in equation (7) enable us to compare otherwise similar putts. For 
example, we compare birdie and par putts attempted from the same distance to 
the hole. It is important, however, to note why variation in shot values exists after 
controlling for distance and other factors. For example, par and birdie putts may 
5 2,549 observations (<0.01 percent of data) were deleted due to odd data values (e.g., putts attempted more than 
1,000 inches from the hole). 
6 Many players played in only one or two Tournaments during our sample period. Since we are running regres-
sions with player fixed effects (as well as hole fixed effects), each player adds to the computational difficulty. Using 
the entire sample results in regressions that will not run due to space constraints or take weeks to finish. By eliminat-
ing players who have few observations, we dramatically reduce the computational demands while eliminating only 
a small fraction of the total observations.
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be attempted from the same distance on a particular hole. The differences in shot 
value reflect the accuracy and distance with which prior shots were hit on that hole 
(e.g., a well-hit versus a badly hit tee shot). After controlling for player and hole 
fixed effects, we argue that these prior-to-the-putt differences are based on idiosyn-
cratic factors that are unrelated to the putt itself.7 
IV.  Results
A. Main Effects
Predictably, distance is a key determinant of putt success. As we plot in Figure 
2, the probability of making par and birdie putts declines with distance to the hole. 
More interestingly, we document a consistent difference between par and birdie putt 
success. For a given distance, golfers are approximately 2–4 percentage points more 
likely to make par putts than they are to make birdie putts.
Consistent with Figure 2 and supporting Prediction 1, we report results from logit 
regression analyses in Table 2 that demonstrate that birdie and eagle putts are less 
accurate than par, bogey, and double bogey putts. Controlling for distance (Table 2, 
column 1), putts attempted for birdie or eagle are 2.0 percentage points less likely to 
be made than putts attempted for par, bogey, or double bogey. This value is statisti-
cally significant and has a high degree of precision (t = 43.2).
In this regression and across all of our regressions, we include a seventh-order 
polynomial for distance to the hole. Goodness-of-fit tests suggest that a seventh-
order polynomial is necessary and sufficient to control for this important variable.
In column 2 of Table 2, we report results from a logit regression that includes 
indicator variables for each putt type (e.g., putt for birdie, eagle, bogey, and double 
bogey). Par serves as the omitted category. Results from this regression suggest 
that eagle putts are the least likely to be made, followed by birdie putts. These find-
ings are consistent with our second prediction and suggest diminishing sensitivity. 
7 In our analyses, we consider the possibility that the quality of earlier shots may influence putt attempts. For 
example, a golfer may be “having a good day” and thus a good tee shot may be followed by a good putt. Importantly, 
it is worth noting that this type of positive autocorrelation between shots runs counter to the predictions we make. 
We consider this and other alternative accounts later in our analyses. 
Table 1—Summary Statistics
Made putts Missed putts Full sample
Average distance to the hole (inches) 50.8 269.4 136.3
Fraction of putts for par 63.9 20.6 47.0
Fraction of putts for birdie 18.5 73.1 39.8
Fraction of putts for eagle 0.3 3.0 1.3
Fraction of putts for bogey 15.1 2.4 10.2
Fraction of putts for double bogey 2.1 1.0 1.7
Observations 1,538,198 986,963 2,525,161
Note: This table provides summary statistics for putts taken in the PGA Tour between 2004 
and 2009.
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Bogey putts are more likely to be made than par putts, and double bogey putts are 
slightly less likely to be made than par putts. The coefficient for double bogey putts 
is consistent with diminishing sensitivity, but the coefficient for bogey putts is not. 
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Figure 2
Notes: This figure depicts the fraction of successful par and birdie putts by distance to the hole (in inches). The 
sample includes 2,525,161 putts attempted in the PGA Tour between 2004 and 2008.
Table 2—The Effect of Different Shot Values on Putt Success
Dependent variable equals 1 if putt was made 
Logit estimation
(1) (2)
Putt for birdie or eagle −0.020***
(0.001)




Putt for bogey 0.009***
(0.001)
Putt for double bogey −0.006***
(0.002)
Putt distance: 7th-order polynomial X X
Pseudo R2 0.550 0.550
Observations 2,525,161 2,525,161
Notes: This table reports marginal effects and robust standard errors for the differential suc-
cess rate of putts of different shot values (par, birdie, etc.) from a logit regression. Column 1 
compares putts taken for birdie and eagle relative to the omitted category—putts taken for par, 
bogey, and double bogey. Column 2 compares each shot value separately relative to the omit-
ted catergory, par.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
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B. Alternative Classical Explanations
Though our findings are consistent with loss aversion, we consider a number of 
alternative explanations. In our next set of analyses, we use a Linear Probability 
Model rather than the more computational intensive Logit Model, because we 
include a large number of fixed effects. In our most detailed specification, we include 
more than 300,000 fixed effects.
To provide a point of comparison, in column 1 in Table 3 we report a simple speci-
fication including different putt types and the seventh-order distance polynomial. 
Reflecting differences between OLS and logit, the estimates in this regression are 
slightly larger than those in Table 2. Still, the basic findings remain.
Differences in Player Ability.—We first consider player fixed effects. Some play-
ers may be good drivers (hitting long shots from the tee to the green) but bad putters, 
and others may be bad drivers but good putters. If this were true, player differences 
Table 3—The Effect of Different Shot Values on Putt Success–Robustness Checks
Dependent variable equals 1 if putt was made  
(OLS estimation)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Putt for eagle −0.040*** −0.039*** −0.030*** −0.042*** −0.039*** −0.036*** −0.036*** −0.064***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Putt for birdie  −0.036*** −0.036*** −0.026*** −0.029*** −0.028*** −0.028*** −0.028*** −0.030***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Putt for bogey 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Putt for double −0.007*** −0.006*** −0.005** −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.002 0.001
 bogey (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Putt distance:  
 seventh-order  
 polynomial 
X X X X X X X X
Player fixed effects X X X X X X X
Previous-putts-on- 
 green effects 
X X X X X X
Tournament-round- 
 hole effects 
X
4 hole-location  
 effects 
X
8 hole-location  
 effects 
X




 make-putt effects 
X
R2 0.598 0.598 0.599 0.603 0.612 0.626 0.646 0.670
Observations 2,525,161 2,525,161 2,525,161 2,525,161 2,525,161 2,525,161 2,525,161 2,525,161
Notes: This table reports estimates and robust standard errors for the differential success rate of putts of differ-
ent shot values (par, birdie, etc.) using OLS. Increasingly precise controls are included in each column including: 
player fixed effects, dummy variables for the number of putts previously attempted on the green by the golfer and 
the other golfer in a player’s group, fixed effects for each hole in a given round and tournament, fixed effects for 
4, 8, and 16 location areas for each hole, and fixed effects for the score if the putt is successful for every hole in a 
given round and tournament.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
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could account for our finding that birdie putts are less accurate than par putts. To 
address this question, we include player fixed effects, and we report results from 
this regression in column 2 of Table 3. We find no significant change in our findings. 
Still, we include player fixed effects in all future specifications.
Learning.—Alternatively, players may learn about the condition of the green from 
earlier putts. After putting once, golfers may learn important information about the 
slope or conditions on the green. Compared to birdie putts, par putts are more likely 
to be the second putt attempted by a golfer on the green. As a result, par putts may be 
more accurate than birdie putts, because golfers have learned important information. 
In fact, it is possible that players may learn important information from watching 
their partners putt on the green.
To control for learning effects, we include separate dummy variables for the 
number of putts already attempted on the green by the player and the player’s 
partner.8 The results from this specification suggest that learning is important. As 
we report in column 3 of Table 3, golfers are significantly more likely to make the 
second and third putts on the green than they are to make otherwise similar first 
putts on the green.9
By including controls for prior putts on the green, the point estimates for birdie 
and eagle putts are reduced by 20 to 30 percent. However, the remaining differences 
attributed to birdie or eagle putts relative to par putts remains highly significant. In 
all future specifications, we include these controls.
Throughout our analysis, we assume that players do not learn about the green 
prior to actually putting on the green (at which point we include controls). However, 
it is possible that players learn by watching their approach shots land and roll on the 
green. Given that par putts are more likely to have a shorter approach shot than birdie 
putts, learning from closer approach shots could bias our results. Unfortunately, we 
are unable to control for the entire dynamic process that leads to a putt because this 
process itself is what generates our variation. For example, on par 3 holes there 
is very little variation in par versus birdie putt attempts that had similar approach 
shots. However, we can observe variation on par 5 holes and some par 4 holes. We 
restrict our sample to par and birdie putt attempts with very long approach shots 
(more than 50 or more than 100 yards) where learning about the green is unlikely. 
In separate regressions, we also include a high-degree polynomial of the distance 
of the approach shot. Although the point estimates are smaller (0.6–0.8 percent for 
the birdie coefficient and 0.8–1.0 percent for the eagle coefficient), we continue 
to find highly significant differences between par, birdie, and eagle success when 
we include these controls.10 These smaller point estimates could reflect learning 
from approach shots, increased noise due to the lack of variation in the data, or 
8 Alternatively, one could restrict the sample of putts to those which are first putts attempted on the green. 
Performing this analysis yields a coefficient on the birdie dummy nearly identical to the coefficient when simply 
including dummy variables for the number of own and other shots already taken on the green. 
9 We attribute this effect to learning. However, an alternative psychological phenomenon may be driving this 
reduction. Golfers may have an aversion to taking three putts to finish a hole. If this were true, golfers may try very 
hard after missing a putt to avoid a “three putt.” Alternatively, golfers may update their reference point once they 
arrive on the green. This may cause golfers to work harder on a second putt since missing the second putt may be 
coded as a loss. We are unable to disentangle these accounts from learning about the green. 
10 We also continue to find moderation effects by round and that golfers lay the ball up short on birdie putts. 
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differences in expectations consistent with K ˝    oszegi and Rabin (2006). K ˝    oszegi and 
Rabin’s account suggests that when players expect to perform better, the par-birdie 
differential should be smaller. In Section IVF, we consider and test this possibility.
As we discuss at the end of the paper, this finding is consistent with the K ˝    oszegi-
Rabin prediction that the par-birdie differential should be smaller in situations where 
players expect to perform better (par 5 holes).  
Differences across Holes.—We next consider fixed effects for specific holes. It is 
possible, for example, that holes with easy fairways have difficult greens and that 
holes with difficult fairways have easy greens. If this were true, birdie putts may be 
more common than par putts on holes with difficult greens.
To account for this possibility, we include fixed effects for each of the 17,096 differ-
ent holes (for a given round and Tournament).11 We report results from this regression 
in column 4 of Table 3. By including these fixed effects, our results actually become 
stronger suggesting that holes with easy fairways may also have easy greens.
Position on the Green.—Although we account for distance, it is possible that birdie 
putts start from a more precarious position on the green than equally distanced par 
putts. For example, approach shots to the green may be shorter for par putts than 
they are for birdie putts, and as a result, players putting for par may be able to avoid 
difficult spots on the green (e.g., sections of the green with awkward slopes).
The level of detail in our dataset enables us to address this concern. We use the x, 
y, z coordinates to control for putts taken from different positions on the green. To 
do this, we first divide the area around each hole in each round in each Tournament 
into four quadrants or “pie pieces.” We characterize each putt attempt by quadrant, 
and we report regression results with dummy variable controls for each quadrant-
hole-round-Tournament in column 5 of Table 3. These fixed effects control for loca-
tion-specific differences.
We conduct even more precise analyses with finer divisions of the space around 
the hole. In column 6 of Table 3, we report regression results that include controls 
for eight “pie pieces” (from dividing the green around each hole into eight sections).
In column 7 of Table 3, we report regression results that include controls for 
16 sections that not only cut the green into eight pie pieces but also include a con-
centric circle of radius 137 inches (the mean putt distance in the data).
From these analyses, we find that certain areas of each green are harder to putt 
from than other areas. By including location-specific effects, we gain predictive 
power; the R2 in the regressions rises from 0.603 (with no location-specific effects) 
to 0.646 (16 location-specific effects per hole).12
More importantly, we find only small declines in point estimates as we control for 
location-specific effects. Location-specific differences influence overall accuracy, 
but they cannot account for the differences we observe across putt types.
11 Locations of the hole on each green are typically changed in every round during a Tournament. For this reason, 
fixed effects for every hole in each round in a Tournament must be included rather than just a fixed effect of each 
hole in a four-round Tournament. 
12 Adjusted R2 values increase by a more modest amount (0.599 to 0.608).
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Position in the Tournament.—We next control for each golfer’s standing in the 
Tournament. When golfers attempt birdie or par putts, they may exert different 
amounts of effort depending upon their standing in the Tournament. For example, it 
is possible that golfers may be more likely to attempt birdie putts when they are far 
behind and are exerting less effort.
To account for the possibility that player scores influence our finding, we control 
for each golfer’s score in the Tournament when attempting each putt. We include 
dummy variables that represent a combination of the hole that a golfer is on and 
his overall Tournament score if he makes the putt.13 For example, imagine that one 
golfer attempts a par putt on the second hole of the first round of a Tournament and 
a second golfer attempts a birdie putt on the same second hole. Imagine further that 
the first golfer attempting the par putt has a score of −1 from the first hole (indicat-
ing that he shot a birdie on the first hole), and the second golfer attempting the birdie 
putt has a score of 0 going from the first hole (indicating that he shot par on the 
first hole). These two golfers would both have a fixed effect indicating that if they 
made their current putts, they would both earn a score of −1 (after two holes). This 
example illustrates how these fixed effects partition each putt into a bucket of putts 
that, if made, will place the golfers in the same scoring position in the Tournament.
We report results from this analysis in column 8 in Table 3. We find that our 
main result is not affected by these additional controls. Even accounting for golf-
ers’ score, golfers make birdie putts 3.0 percentage points less often than otherwise 
similar par putts.
Matching Model.—In addition to conducting parametric analyses with control 
variables, we conduct nonparametric analyses to test alternative explanations that 
might account for our findings. Though we lose some statistical power with this 
approach, we are able to compare par and birdie putts in novel ways.
First, we consider a matching model to compare par and birdie putts taken from 
the same spot on a particular hole, in a particular round, in a particular Tournament. 
We begin by creating a list of every par putt in our dataset. We then use a matching 
algorithm to identify the birdie putt on the same hole-round-Tournament with the 
shortest linear distance from each par putt. For some holes, there are no birdie putts 
attempted from a position near a par putt. However, on many holes a birdie and a par 
putt were attempted from nearly the exact same x, y, and z coordinate.
We report results from our matched par-birdie analyses in Table 4. In column 1, 
we report results from the 2,828 pairs of par and birdie putts that were attempted 
within one inch of each other. Consistent with our thesis and our parametric results, 
from the same position on the green golfers made their par putts significantly more 
often than they made their birdie putts (88.0 percent of the time versus 83.5 percent 
of the time, p < 0.001).
In columns 2–8 we report results from pairs of par and birdie putts that were 
attempted within two, three, four, five, eight, 12, and 24 inches of each other. With 
13 One might imagine other ways to control for a golfer’s position in the Tournament (e.g., strokes behind the 
current leader). The problem, however, with many of these alternatives is that golfers play at different times of the 
day, and thus a golfer may have the best score at a particular moment in time, but it is simply because other golfers 
have not yet started the course.
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larger distances, we increase the number of matched pairs, but of course, these 
matches are less precise. Across these analyses, we find that golfers made their par 
putts between 1.5 percent and 3.1 percent more often than they made their birdie 
putts.
The effect sizes of these results are smaller than some of the effect sizes we reported 
in the parametric analyses (e.g., 3.6 percent in column 1 of Table 3). However, this 
difference stems from the nature of the putts in our matched sample. Most of the 
putts in our matched sample are putts very close to the hole (the average putt length 
for putts in columns 1–8 in Table 4 is only 35–50 inches). Golfers almost always 
make very short putts, and the difference between the probability of making par 
and birdie putts for very short putts is small. Thus, while the effect sizes may seem 
slightly smaller, if we account for the proximity of the putts they actually are not. 
We illustrate this in the Web Appendix by running analyses similar to Table 3 using 
the matched data sample. Overall, the results from the matching estimation suggest 
that our findings are robust to nonparametric controls of distance and green location.
C. Alternative Psychological Explanations
Psychological factors can influence putt accuracy (Sian Beilock et al. 2001; 
Beilock et al. 2004), and in this section we consider two psychological phenomena 
that might account for our findings: overconfidence and nervousness.
Overconfidence.—Overconfidence can harm performance in a number of domains. 
For example, overconfidence harms judgment accuracy (Sarah Lichtenstein, Baruch 
Fischhoff, and Lawrence Phillips 1982; Asher Koriat, Lichtenstein, and Fischhoff 
1980), forecast accuracy (Robert Vallone et al. 1990) and investment decisions 
(Brad M. Barber and Odean 2001). We consider overconfidence as a possible expla-
nation for our findings.
After hitting a well-placed shot, golfers may become overconfident or cocky in a 
way that harms their performance on their next shot. By construction, birdie putts 
are more likely to follow well-hit drives than par putts. Therefore, overconfidence 
Table 4—Estimates from Matching Par and Birdie Putts
Maximum distance between matched par and birdie putts
< 1 inch < 2 inches < 3 inches < 4 inches < 5 inches < 8 inches < 12 inches < 24 inches
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Fraction of matched 0.835 0.878 0.895 0.897 0.895 0.881 0.861 0.812
 birdie putts made (0.010) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Fraction of matched 0.880 0.905 0.914 0.912 0.910 0.900 0.882 0.843
 par putts made (0.009) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Average distance of  
 matched birdie putts 
49.50 39.67 36.81 36.76 36.98 39.63 43.69 53.63
Average distance of  
 matched par putts 
49.50 39.67 36.77 36.70 36.87 39.35 43.11 51.81
Number of pairs 2,828 9,547 20,019 33,239 48,136 97,281 162,418 329,793
Notes: For every par putt in the data, a birdie putt taken on the same hole, in the same round, in the same tourna-
ment is matched to the par putt if the distance between the par and birdie putt is less than the indicated amount in 
the table. We report distances from less than 1 inch to less than 24 inches in columns 1–8. We report the fractions of 
matched par and birdie putts that were made along with standard errors. We also report the average distance of the 
matched par and birdie putts for each distance cutoff.
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might account for our finding that golfers exhibit negative autocorrelation (after hit-
ting a good shot, their next shot is likely to be bad).
We test this account by searching for negative autocorrelation in performance. 
Using methods similar to those used by Cotton and Price (2006), we compare per-
formance across holes. Consistent with Cotton and Price’s (2006) results, rather 
than finding negative autocorrelation, we find positive autocorrelation; when golfers 
score one stroke less on a hole relative to average performance on a hole, they are 
likely to score 0.004 (p < 0.01) fewer strokes than average performance on the next 
hole.14 That is, absent a story of loss aversion, our best evidence suggests positive 
autocorrelation across shots; overconfidence or cockiness cannot account for our 
findings.
In addition, overconfidence is inconsistent with the set of ancillary results we 
report later in the paper. For example, prior research demonstrates that overconfi-
dence promotes aggressive behavior (Camerer and Dan Lovallo 1999). We find that 
golfers actually hit birdie putts less hard than they hit similar par putts.
Nervousness.—The second psychological account we consider is nervousness. 
Golfers on the PGA Tour hit putts that have large financial consequences, and prior 
work has found that people often feel nervous or anxious when they face high stakes 
(Julie McCarthy and Richard Goffin 2004; Beilock 2008; Dan Ariely et al. 2009). 
Feelings of nervousness harm performance by disrupting task-focused thinking 
(Irwin Sarason 1984) and by motivating people to make expedient choices to exit 
their current situation (Alison Wood and Schweitzer 2010).
If golfers value making a birdie putt more than they value making a par putt, they 
might get nervous and “choke” when putting for birdie. Similarly, golfers may get 
nervous when taking a birdie putt because a successful birdie putt may advance a 
golfer into a better position in the Tournament.
The nervousness account, however, cannot explain our results. First, although 
amateur golfers may infrequently take birdie putts, professional golfers attempt 
nearly as many birdie putts as they do par putts. Second, even when successful 
birdie and par putts both would place golfers in a similar position, golfers are still 
more likely to make par putts than birdie putts. As we report in column 8 of Table 3, 
golfers’ relative putt accuracy is unaffected by golfers’ scores.
The nervousness account is also inconsistent with three aspects of our ancillary 
results. First, as we demonstrate in the following section, players hit their birdie 
putts shorter than they hit otherwise similar par putts. Second, we demonstrate that 
even the best golfers including Tiger Woods exhibit this bias in early rounds of 
Tournaments. Third, the difference between par and birdie putts diminishes across 
rounds. Nervousness cannot explain these findings.
Finally, though perhaps least persuasive, we offer anecdotal evidence. Consistent 
with our thesis, and contradicting the nervousness account, several golfers have 
stated that they actually value par putts more than they value birdie putts. For 
example, after playing a round in 2007, Tiger Woods explained, “Any time you 
14 We find consistent results using different methods (e.g., with and without player-specific controls and alter-
native nonparametric methods that correct for problems that arise when using fixed effects and lagged dependent 
variables).
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make big par putts, I think it’s more important to make those than birdie putts. You 
don’t ever want to drop a shot. The psychological difference between dropping a 
shot and making a birdie, I just think it’s bigger to make a par putt.”
D. Differences across Rounds
The difference in accuracy between par and birdie putts is remarkably robust 
across a range of parameters including players, position on the green, and players’ 
scores. However, we find that the difference in accuracy between par and birdie 
putts diminishes considerably, but does not disappear, across rounds.
As we report in Table 5 in columns 1–4, the difference in accuracy between par 
and birdie putts diminishes monotonically from 3.8 percent in Round 1 to 2.1 per-
cent in Round 4 (p < 0.001). We find a similar pattern for the discrepancy between 
the accuracy of par and eagle putts.
Of course, a selection effect could contribute to the round effect that we observe. 
A third of players do not advance to rounds 3 and 4, and if these players exhibit bias 
in rounds 1 and 2, the differences we observe in early and later rounds could reflect 
differences in the population rather than an effect of round.
To address this concern, we conduct the same analyses but include only partici-
pants who completed all four rounds of the Tournament. The round effect remains. 
As before, the par-birdie discrepancy in accuracy diminishes by half between the 
first and the fourth round.
Table 5—The Effect of Different Shot Values on Putt Success–By Round
Dependent variable equals 1 if putt was made  
(OLS estimation)
Full sample 4-round players only
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4
Putt for eagle −0.053*** −0.044*** −0.028*** −0.031*** −0.065*** −0.057*** −0.028*** −0.031***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Putt for birdie  −0.038*** −0.028*** −0.024*** −0.021*** −0.046*** −0.035*** −0.024*** −0.021***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Putt for bogey 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003** 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Putt for double bogey −0.003 −0.004 0.001 −0.001 −0.003 0.002 −0.004 −0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Putt distance: seventh-order  
 polynomial 
X X X X X X X X
Player fixed effects X X X X X X X X
Previous-putts-on-green  
 effects 
X X X X X X X X
Tournament-round-hole effects X X X X X X X X
R2 0.599 0.598 0.610 0.611 0.592 0.599 0.610 0.611
Observations 791,112 773,476 477,732 469,140 440,824 440,171 477,732 469,140
Notes: This table reports estimates and robust standard errors for the differential success rate of putts of differ-
ent shot values (par, birdie, etc.) using OLS while controlling for several baseline covariates. The coefficients are 
reported when cutting the data by round. Columns 1–4 indicate coefficients for rounds 1–4, respectively, when using 
all putts attempted in all rounds. Columns 5–8 indicate coefficients for rounds 1–4, respectively, when restricting 
the sample to putts taken by players that played all four rounds of the tournament. This data restriction adjusts for 
the sample attrition that takes place in golf tournaments after the second round.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
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The finding that the round of play moderates our effect is interesting for two 
reasons. First, this finding demonstrates that the discrepancy in accuracy between 
birdie and par putts is not automatic and argues against alternative accounts. For 
example, none of the following alternative explanations can account for why the 
discrepancy would diminish across rounds: birdie putts are more difficult than par 
putts because they start from a more precarious position on the green, birdie putts 
are more difficult than par putts because they follow a longer approach shot, or 
birdie putts are more difficult than par putts because players learn more information 
prior to taking a par shot.
Second, the finding that the round of play moderates our effect is interesting 
because it is consistent with our reference point story. In the first round, the ref-
erence point of par is likely to be very salient for golfers. By the fourth round, 
however, other reference points such as the scores of other golfers are likely to be 
more salient. These competing reference points are likely to diminish the influence 
of par on performance. In fact, some golfers colloquially refer to Round 3 of PGA 
Tournaments (typically Saturday) as “moving day.” After a third of the players have 
been cut, golfers may shift their focus to their peer’s performance as they try to 
change their rank or “move.”
E. Differences in Risk Aversion
According to Prospect Theory, economic agents are risk averse in the domain of 
gains and risk seeking in the domain of losses. If golfers narrowly bracket on indi-
vidual holes and adopt par as their reference point, we would expect golfers to be 
more risk averse when hitting birdie and eagle putts than they are when they hit par, 
bogey, and double bogey putts.
When putting, golfers balance two objectives. One objective is to hit the ball into 
the hole. The second objective is to limit the difficulty of a follow-on shot should 
they miss their putt. On average, conditional on missing the putt, golfers hit the ball 
15–25 inches past the hole. Risk averse putts are putts that are hit short. Risk averse 
putts sacrifice the likelihood of hitting the ball into the hole to limit the difficulty of 
a follow-on shot. Within our framework, we expect birdie and eagle putts to be hit 
less hard than par, bogey, and double bogey putts.
Consistent with our thesis, conditional on missing the putt, golfers hit birdie and 
eagle putts significantly less hard than they hit par, bogey, and double bogey putts. 
We report results from OLS regressions in Table 6 in columns 1 and 2. These regres-
sions include missed putts and predict the probability of leaving a putt short of the 
hole as a function of the type of putt attempted. Eagle putts, on average, are hit 0.80 
inches less hard than equally distanced par putts, and birdie putts are hit 0.19 inches 
less hard than par putts. Surprisingly, bogey and double bogey putts are also hit 
softer than par putts, although there are very few missed bogey and double bogey 
putts. In this analysis, the standard errors of these estimates are very large.
In Table 6 in column 2, we also report the probability that the ball will be hit short 
of the hole. Consistent with our thesis, eagle and birdie putts are both significantly 
more likely to be hit short of the hole than par putts. In Table 6 in columns 3 and 4, 
we provide similar results to those we report in columns 1 and 2, but we restrict the 
sample to putts longer than 270 inches (the average putt distance for missed putts). 
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These estimates, which are larger than those found in columns 1 and 2, suggest that 
the effects are strongest for long putts.15
In Figure 3, we depict where missed par and birdie putts stop on the green with 
respect to the hole. We normalize each putt as if it were lined up with the hole 
from the left side of the x-axis. We divide the green around the hole into a series of 
12 inch × 12 inch boxes. We then run separate OLS regressions for each box. The 
dependent variable is a binary outcome equal to one if the missed putt stopped in the 
box. The numbers represented in each box are the coefficient of birdie putts from 
these regressions. Positive numbers indicate that birdie putts are more likely to stop 
in the box than par putts. Negative numbers indicate that par putts are more likely to 
stop in the box than birdie putts.
In Figure 3, the positive numbers in front of the hole illustrate that birdie putts 
are more likely to stop in front of the hole, and that par putts are more likely to stop 
behind the hole. We report similar analyses in Figure 3, panel B. In this figure, we 
restrict the sample to missed putts attempted from more than 270 inches (the aver-
age distance of a missed putt). As before, this figure demonstrates that birdie putts 
are hit less hard than par putts.
Is risk aversion helpful? Birdie putts are hit less hard than par putts. Though birdie 
putts are less likely than par putts to land in the hole, softer hits make the follow-on 
shots after missed birdie putts easier than follow-on shots after missed par putts.
15 For very short putts, putts less than 200 inches, we find no differences. Notably, the risk aversion account 
cannot explain the entire par-birdie accuracy gap. 
Table 6—The Effect of Different Shot Values on Risk Aversion
Ordinary least squares
All missed  
putts 
Missed putts longer  











Make next putt 
(5)
Putt for eagle −0.80** 0.013*** −2.44*** 0.032*** −0.003
(0.32) (0.003) (0.56) (0.006) (0.002)
Putt for birdie  −0.19** 0.003*** −1.59*** 0.019*** 0.001**
(0.08) (0.001) (0.27) (0.003) (0.001)
Putt for bogey −0.365 0.007*** 0.65 0.000 −0.003
(0.19) (0.003) (0.72) (0.008) (0.001)
Putt for double bogey −0.053 0.008 0.41 −0.001 −
(0.29) (0.004) (0.95) (0.011) −
Putt distance: seventh-order  
 polynomial 
X X X X X
Player fixed effects X X X X X
Previous-putts-on-green effects X X X X X
Tournament-round-hole effects X X X X X
R2 0.968 0.169 0.918 0.127 0.095
Observations 986,963 986,963 406,942 406,942 977,500
Notes: This table reports estimates and robust standard errors for the differential success rate of putts of different 
shot values (par, birdie, etc.) using OLS. Columns 1 and 2 report the estimates of shot value on putt length and lay-
ing up short of the hole using all missed putts in the data. Columns 3 and 4 provide similar estimates but for putts 
attempted at a distance of more than 270 inches (the average distance of a missed putt). Column 5 reports the impact 
of shot value on the probability of making the next putt (conditional on missing the current putt).
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
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In Table 4 in column 5, we report results predicting whether or not the follow-on 
shot landed in the hole conditional on missing the current putt. Results from this 
analysis indicate that the softer birdie putts do indeed improve the probability of 
making a follow-up shot. However, the size of this effect (0.1 percent) is only mar-
ginally significant and is overwhelmed by the decreased probability of making the 
Panel A. All missed putts





























0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.002 0.005 0.007 –0.004 –0.005 –0.001 0.001
0.001 0.002 0.005 0.007 –0.004 –0.006 –0.003 0.001
0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 –0.001 0.000 0.000
0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002 –0.001 –0.002 –0.001 –0.002
0.001 0.001 0.002 –0.001 –0.001 –0.002 –0.002 –0.003
0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
0.000 –0.001 0.001 0.001 –0.001 0.000 0.000 –0.001
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 –0.001 0.000 0.000
Figure 3
Notes: This figure provides a graphical illustration of where each missed putt (Figure 3a) and each missed putt taken 
from more than 220 inches away, a distance greater than the average missed putt length (Figure 3b) came to a rest. 
Each putt is oriented so as to be taken from the left side of the x axis and the hole at the origin. We conducted a sepa-
rate regression (with controls) for each 12 inch × 12 inch box with a dummy dependent variable indicating whether 
the missed putt came to rest in the box. The number in each box is the coefficient on a birdie putt indicator. Positive 
(negative) coefficients indicate that birdie putts are more (less) likely to come to rest in the box than par putts. 
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initial putt. That is, the increased probability of making a follow-up shot by hitting 
a birdie putt softly does not come close to compensating for the loss of accuracy in 
hitting birdie putts.16
This finding is consistent with other analyses not reported, such as analyses esti-
mating the total number of strokes required to finish the hole following a par or 
birdie putt. The results are nearly identical when looking at total future strokes, 
because the advantage to laying it up short is overwhelmed by the decrease in accu-
racy of the original putt.
While golfers are more risk averse when putting for birdie, this aversion cannot 
explain the entire difference in putt success between birdie and par putts that we 
find. Birdie putts are more likely to be laid up short of the hole, but they also are 
significantly more likely to miss the hole to the left or right.17 Because of these left-
right mistakes, the distance of follow-up shots from missed birdie putts is similar to 
the distance from missed par putts. Thus, birdie putts are missed more often due to 
both risk aversion as well as left-right mistakes.
F. K ˝    oszegi-Rabin Reference Points
In our conceptual framework and in our analyses, we have assumed that golfers 
making reference dependent choices adopt par as their point of reference. In recent 
theoretical work, K ˝    oszegi and Rabin (2006) suggest that rational expectations might 
serve as the point of reference for reference-dependent choices. A recent empirical 
study supports this idea. Crawford and Meng (2008) found that by allowing rational 
expectations to inform reference points for hours worked and income earned, they 
were able to fit a model of cabdrivers’ labor supply decisions with greater accuracy 
(Camerer et al. 1997; Henry S. Farber 2005). Farber (2008) and Doran (2008) also 
study cabdriver labor supply and also make significant contributions to understand-
ing reference point adaptation. Farber (2008) allows reference points to be different 
across people but treats the income reference points as latent variables (as opposed 
to assigning reference points based on rational expectations). Doran (2008) finds 
that cabdrivers who display reference-dependent preferences did not change their 
hours worked following an exogenous permanent wage increase. This finding is 
consistent with K ˝    oszegi-Rabin’s (2006) model of reference point adaptation.
Although par is likely to be a salient reference point, professional golfers may 
develop expectations for their performance that are different from par. For example, 
on an easy par-five hole an expert golfer may expect to complete the hole with four 
shots. In this case, four (rather than five) shots may serve as the reference point.
We consider a rational expectations approach for reference point adoption. In 
our next set of analyses, we use the average score on each hole by the entire field 
of golfers, rather than par, as the reference point. In Figure 4, we depict how this 
rational expectations approach changes our predictions. In Figure 4a, we illustrate 
16 Although players hit birdie putts less hard, these shots also have greater left-right variance. As a result, follow-
up putts after a birdie putt are from a similar distance as follow-up putts after a par putt.
17 This can be shown by calculating the angle (using the law of cosines) between the starting and ending position 
of the ball relative to the hole—where an angle of zero indicates that the ball ended along the straight line between 
the starting position and the hole. Analyses indicate that this angle (left/right mistake) is significantly larger for 
birdie putts than for par putts.   
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how loss aversion influences putt accuracy if golfers adopt par as the reference point. 
In Figure 4b, we illustrate how loss aversion influences putt accuracy if golfers adopt 
the average score on each hole (our proxy for rational expectations) as the reference 
point.18 We develop predictions for eagle, birdie, par, bogey, and double bogey putts, 
but we focus particular attention on the contrast between birdie and par putts.
18 Figure 4 derives from Prospect Theory with no diminishing sensitivity. Depending on the degree of diminish-
ing sensitivity, Figures 4A and 4B would both change in predictable ways. For example, diminishing sensitivity in 
the gain domain only (similar to what we find in our results) would cause the following changes to Figure 4B: the 
eagle line would shift downward and become concave to the origin to the left of 0 and convex to the origin to the 
right of 0, the birdie line would become convex to the origin to the left of zero and would remain under the x-axis 
(even at 1) to the right of zero, and the bogey line would grow more steeply as it approached 1. 
Panel A. Constant reference points



















Notes: This figure illustrates the theoretical predictions for putt success for different shot values relative to par, 
assuming par as the reference point (panel A) and assuming rational expectations equal to the empirical score on 
each hole as the reference point (panel B).
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If the average score on a hole is the same as par, our predictions in Figure 4 panel 
A and panel B are the same. We expect golfers to be less likely to make birdie and 
eagle putts than par, bogey, and double bogey putts. In this case, we expect golfers 
to be more accurate hitting their par putts than their birdie putts.
If the average score on a hole is one over par (a difficult hole), then golfers who 
adopt rational expectations will expect their bogey putt to be the putt that finishes 
the hole. In this case, golfers will perceive par, birdie, and eagle putts to be in the 
“gain domain,” and we expect golfers to be less accurate hitting these putts than oth-
erwise similar bogey and double bogey putts. In this case, we expect par and birdie 
putts to be hit similarly.
Analogously, if the average score on a hole is one under par (an easy hole), then 
golfers who adopt rational expectations will expect their birdie putt to be the putt 
that finishes the hole. In this case, golfers will perceive only eagle putts to be in the 
gain domain, and we expect golfers to hit their eagle putts less accurately than oth-
erwise similar birdie, par, bogey, and double bogey putts. In this case, we expect par 
and birdie putts to be hit similarly.
Our key prediction in testing the K ˝    oszegi and Rabin (2006) framework is the “V 
shape” pattern depicted in Figure 4 panel B representing the relationship between 
the relative accuracy of par and birdie putts. When average scores on a hole are 
either one above or one below par, the expectations-as-reference-points model pre-
dicts that golfers will hit their par and birdie putts similarly. When average scores 
on a hole equal par, the expectations-as-reference-points model predicts that golfers 
will hit their par putts more accurately than they hit their birdie putts.
To test these predictions, we divided the data into quintiles according to the diffi-
culty of the hole relative to par. The first quintile includes holes with average scores 
much lower than par (very easy holes); the fifth quintile includes holes with average 
scores much higher than par (very difficult holes). The variation in hole difficulty, 
however, is limited. Compared to par, the average hole scores for the first and fifth 
quintiles are −0.30 and 0.33, respectively. The coefficient and standard errors from 
a logit regression for each quintile are presented in the Web Appendix and the coef-
ficients are presented in Figure 5.19
Consistent with the expectations-as-reference-points predictions, informed by 
K ˝    oszegi and Rabin (2006), we find that the accuracy difference between par and 
birdie putts diminishes for difficult holes; the relative accuracy declines from 
2.9 percent on moderately difficult holes (holes with average scores equal to par) to 
2.3 percent for difficult holes (holes with average scores equal to 0.3 strokes more 
than par), p < 0.001. However, the accuracy difference between par and birdie putts 
does not diminish for easy holes; the accuracy difference does not decline from 
moderately difficult holes (holes with average scores equal to par) to difficult holes 
(holes with average scores equal to −0.3 strokes less than par).
The expectations-as-reference-points model predicts that bogey putts will be hit 
as accurately as par putts on moderate and easy holes (holes with average scores 
equal to or lower than par), but more accurately than par putts on difficult holes 
19 For these regressions, we use logit rather than OLS, because logit regression allows the shot value coeffi-
cients to vary with distance. This enables the coefficients to reflect more accurately the changes in distance across 
quintiles.
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(holes with average scores higher than par). Our results do not uniformly support 
these predictions, but we do find that bogey putts are hit relatively more accurately 
than par putts as hole difficulty increases.
The pattern of results we observe for eagle putts is not consistent with the expecta-
tions-as-reference-points predictions. Eagle putts, however, comprise only 1.3 per-
cent of the putts in our data, and within our quintile analyses, the standard errors 
of the estimates we plot in Figure 6 are very large. For example, the coefficient 
for eagle putts in the fifth quintile, which is inconsistent with the expectations-as-
reference-points prediction, is only marginally different from par (the expectations-
as-reference-points prediction).
By accounting for endogenized reference points derived from rational expecta-
tions, we increase the predictive validity of our models. Taken together, our results 
offer some support for the expectations-as-reference-points predictions.
G. Heterogeneity in Loss Aversion
We next consider heterogeneity across players. We consider individual differ-
ences, and we explore the possibility that the most experienced golfers exhibit less 
loss aversion than other players.
For each golfer, we measure the accuracy difference between par and birdie putts. 
We measure this effect with the birdie coefficient produced by an OLS model that 
uses par as the baseline (see Table 3, column 1).
On average, golfers make their birdie putts 3.6 percentage points less often than 
they make otherwise similar par putts. We find, however, substantial variation across 
Figure 5
Note: This figure graphs the relative putt accuracy for birdie, eagle, and bogey compared to par for each of five quin-
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players. We depict this variation in a histogram in Figure 6 panel A, and we find 
that the variation in loss aversion across players is significant (in a chi-squared test, 
p < 0.001). Consistent with loss aversion, the large majority of players (94 percent) 
have negative point estimates.
Prior work has found that experience can eliminate judgment biases (e.g., List 2003, 
2004), and with our data we consider the possibility that expertise mitigates loss aver-
sion. We use each player’s 2007 World Golf Rank as a measure of expertise. In Figure 
6 panel B, we present a scatter plot of each golfer’s 2007 World Golf Rank and his 
relative accuracy coefficient for birdie. We find no significant relationship between a 
golfer’s overall rank and his tendency to miss birdie relative to par putts (p = 0.90).
Panel A. Histogram of birdie coefficients
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Figure 6
Notes: Figure 6A plots a histogram of the relative accuracy of birdie putts compared to par putts using our baseline 
specification (column 1 of Table 3) for each of the 421 golfers in our dataset. Figure 6B plots the relative accuracy 
of birdie compared to par putts for each golfer by each golfer’s 2007 World Golf Rank.
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H. Size of the Effects
To understand the magnitude of the effects we observe, we consider how hit-
ting birdie putts as accurately as otherwise similar par putts would change expected 
Tournament winnings. On average, golfers who play all four rounds in our sample 
attempt 45.1 birdie putts in each Tournament. Using our most conservative esti-
mates, we calculate that if golfers hit each of their birdie putts as accurately as they 
hit otherwise similar par putts, their Tournament score would improve by more than 
one stroke per Tournament.
In professional golf, improving a score by one stroke is substantial. In Table 7, for 
each of the top 20 golfers in 2007, we list the number of 2007 Tournaments in which 
he participated, his average score across these Tournaments, and his Tournament earn-
ings for 2007. On average, the top 20 golfers earned nearly $4 million in Tournament 
earnings alone.20 For each player, we created a counterfactual and calculated the addi-
tional amount he would have earned had he improved his score by one stroke in each 
of the Tournaments in which he participated (assuming that other players’ scores 
remained unchanged). On average, these golfers would have earned an additional 
$640,000 (17.6 percent). These results offer insight into the importance of our effect, 
20 For the top golfers, Tournament earnings are likely to underestimate the total value they receive from doing 
well in golf. For example, due mainly to endorsements, Forbes (2006. "Not as Rich as You'd Think." Forbes, 
September 18. http://www.forbes.com/2006/09/15/cx_aolarpslide.html) declared Tiger Woods’ net worth to be 
$500 million—far more than his approximately $83 million in career Tournament earnings as of the end of 2008.












earnings if scored 
1 stroke better
% earnings  
increase if scored 
1 stroke better
1 Tiger Woods 16 69.1 $10,867,052 $945,532 8.70
2 Vijay Singh 27 70.39 $4,728,376 $584,550 12.36
3 Jim Furyk 23 70.21 $4,154,046 $1,530,232 36.84
4 Phil Mickelson 22 70.39 $5,819,988 $659,750 11.34
5 K. J. Choi 25 70.4 $4,587,859 $362,450 7.90
6 Rory Sabbatini 23 70.49 $4,550,040 $902,567 19.84
7 Zach Johnson 23 70.95 $3,922,338 $347,000 8.85
8 Charles Howell III 26 71.47 $2,832,091 $374,500 13.22
9 Brandt Snedeker 29 70.5 $2,836,643 $393,650 13.88
10 Adam Scott 19 70.96 $3,413,185 $221,400 6.49
11 Scott Verplank 23 70.56 $3,114,289 $490,750 15.76
12 Steve Stricker 23 70.19 $4,663,077 $1,077,000 23.10
13 Sergio Garcia 19 70.45 $3,721,185 $784,807 21.09
14 Woody Austin 27 70.84 $2,887,596 $399,066 13.82
15 Hunter Mahan 27 70.78 $2,858,995 $339,533 11.88
16 John Rollins 29 70.97 $2,488,891 $1,005,300 40.39
17 Boo Weekley 29 70.95 $2,613,211 $883,633 33.81
18 Aaron Baddeley 23 70.96 $3,441,119 $277,040 8.05
19 Ernie Els 16 70.5 $2,705,715 $734,633 27.15
20 Mark Calcavecchia 28 71.11 $2,993,332 $504,533 16.86
Average 23.85 70.6 $3,959,951 $640,896 17.6
Notes: We obtained these data for the top 20 ranked golfers from golf.com. (Golf. 2007. "Back on Track." March 
23. http://www.golf.com/golf/tours_news/article/0,28136,1602656,00.html.) Along with their ranks, names, tour-
naments played, average score, and annual tournament earnings, the table provides the additional earnings each 
player would have earned had he increased his score by one stroke per tournament relative to the rest of the golfers.
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but these results should be interpreted with care. Although the top golfers in our data-
set would earn substantially more money if they could hit their birdie putts like their 
par putts, concentration and effort may be limited resources. Quite possibly, golfers 
may be unable to hit all of their putts with equal accuracy.
V.  Discussion and Conclusion
Our results demonstrate that loss aversion, a fundamental bias, continues to per-
sist in a highly competitive market. We find that experienced agents systematically 
exhibit this bias and that it is not only pervasive, but costly.
In our study, we document loss aversion in professional golf. We analyze detailed 
data from the PGA Tour, and we demonstrate that professional golfers hit birdie 
putts less accurately than they hit otherwise similar par putts. We consider a number 
of competing explanations including differences in position on the green, individual 
differences, and learning. We find that none of these explanations can account for 
the pattern of results we observe, and we demonstrate that even the very best golf-
ers—including Tiger Woods—exhibit this bias.
Interestingly, the bias we observe is moderated by round. As the Tournament pro-
gresses, the accuracy gap between par and birdie putts diminishes but is not extin-
guished. This finding implies that the accuracy gap derives from a psychological 
rather than a mechanical process.
Our findings are consistent with Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). 
Rather than broadly bracketing across the 72 holes in a Tournament, players nar-
rowly bracket and adopt the salient reference point of par within each hole. Although 
professional golfers should strive to hit each putt as accurately as possible, golfers 
hit birdie putts (in the domain of “gains”) less accurately and less hard than they hit 
par putts (in the domain of “losses”).
We also consider and find evidence to suggest that golfers use rational expecta-
tions to set reference points (K ˝    oszegi and Rabin 2006). We use average performance 
on holes to gauge hole difficulty, and, consistent with K ˝    oszegi and Rabin (2006), we 
find that the accuracy gap between par and birdie putts diminishes for very difficult 
holes and that the gap between par and bogey putts widens for very difficult holes.
Although we find persistent bias among experienced professionals in a high-
stakes setting, we cannot directly generalize our findings in golf to other domains, 
such as financial advising, real estate, and public policy. Our results, however, are 
suggestive. If Tiger Woods exhibits loss aversion when he plays golf on the PGA 
Tour, judgment biases may be more pervasive than prior research suggests.
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